Supreme Court

It is our view that Klein stands for the position that Congress cannot restrict Supreme Court appellate review in an effort to direct particular substantive results. Congress says that Klein was different and should be distinguished because it involved presidential pardon power. They argue that, despite the broad language in Klein, the decision does not support a general proposition that Congress may not restrict jurisdiction in order to direct substantive outcomes, only that Congress cannot limit our jurisdiction in a manner that violates other constitutional provisions.

Here, however, it would be highly violative of the constitution to uphold the law stripping jurisdiction because this case involves individual rights and “freedoms first principles. ” (see political question discussion for more on this). Congress argues the “exceptions and regulations” power over the court is necessary and essentially a democratic check on the power of the unelected judiciary. We find, however, that argument to be based on a misdefinition of democracy and inconsistent with the purpose of the Constitution.

The purpose of the Constitution is to protect crucial values from majority rule and thus it is undesirable to create a majoritarian check on the process of constitutional interpretation. Federal Legislative Power Commerce Power: The modern affection Doctrine: 1) Substantial Effects: Congress may regulate even local activity if it can rationally conclude that such activity has a substantial adverse effect on interstate commerce, regardless of whether the effect is “direct” or “indirect.

” The courts defer to the congressional judgment. Again, the fact that the law has the purpose or effect of displacing state police power regulation does not make the federal law invalild. 2) Cumulative effects: In determining the adequacy of the effect, Congress may consider the cumulative effect of all the activities regulated even though the contribution of a particular activity may be trivial. * Wickard v. Filburn * Heart of Atlanta – can regulate local if substantial and harmful effect on IC. * Katzenbach v.

McClung – Congress could rationally conclude that racial discrimination in food service industry causes less interstate goods to be sold, that it impedes interstate travel. Restricting the Commerce Power: There must be a rational basis for concluding that the regulated activity substantially affects interstate commerce Among the factors discussed by the Court, the following appear especially relevant. First, the absence of any jurisdictional nexus between the regulated act and interstate commerce makes it more difficult to identify the requisite effect.

Second, it is important to determine whether the regulated activity is economic or non-economic. While the Court has not adopted a categorical rule against aggregating the effect of non-economic intrastate activity in determining if the effect is substantial, the Court indicated that aggregation is appropriate “only where the activity is economic in nature. ” It is also likely that the causal relationship of alleged effects of noneconomic activity on interstate commerce will be more closely scrutinized.

Third, the absence o congressional findings of fact indicating a substantial effect makes it more difficult to evaluate Congress’ judgment, although such findings are not required. Fourth, the effect must be substantial. The causal relationship of the regulated act on interstate commerce must not be attenuated or remote. The fact that the federal law regulates in areas such as criminal law, education or family law where states have historically been sovereign may bear on the reasonableness of a federal law.

(Lopezz; Morrison) Taxing and Spending (walmart unethical behavior): The issue is whether Congress is acting within the scope of its conditional spending power. Article I § 8 of the constitution declares that “The congress shall have power to lay and collect taxes, duties, imposts and excises, to pay the debts and provide for the common defense and general welfare of the United States; but all duties, imposts, and excises shall be uniform throughout the United States.

” In South Dakota v. Dole we gave broad, almost plenary power over spending to Congress when these requirements/restrictions were met: 1) the conditional spending is for the general welfare; 2) the state has a choice, in that pressure has not become compulsion; 3) the condition is substantially related to federal interest through a program or project. * Argue: the conditional spending is substantially related to federal interest.

* Counter: It is not substantially related. O’Connor’s dissent in South Dakota v. Dole would require a there be a direct nexus between the funds’ purpose and the conditions of their use, while the majority only required a tangential or reasonable relationship between the funds’ purpose and the conditions. The taxing power is generally plenary. If congress puts something under the taxing power, it will likely be held Constitutional.